Thomas Jefferson’s Carriage: Arizona v. Gant’s assault on the Belton Doctrine by Fois, Andrew & Simmons, Lauren
American University Criminal Law Brief 
Volume 5 Issue 1 Article 2 
2009 




Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clb 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Fois, Andrew, and Lauren Simmons. "Thomas Jefferson’s Carriage: Arizona v. Gant’s assault on the Belton 
Doctrine." American University Criminal Law Brief 5, no. 1 (2009): 4-32. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews 
at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
American University Criminal Law Brief by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ American University 
Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact kclay@wcl.american.edu. 
Thomas Jefferson’s Carriage: Arizona v. Gant’s 
Assault on the Belton Doctrine
Winter 20094
By Andrew Fois And LAuren simmons1
o
n april 21, 2009, in an important ruling for
all criminal justice practitioners, the United
states supreme Court upended the long
standing law regarding searches of the pas-
senger compartments of automobiles incident to arrest
of the occupants thereof.  in Arizona v. Gant,2 the Court
took on the twenty-eight-year-old rule governing such
searches established by its holding in Belton v. New
York.3 in doing so, the Court has created new standards
that will inevitably lead to confusion and increased liti-
gation over this issue for
years to come.
to begin to under-
stand the road the Court trav-
eled from Belton to Gant,
21st century criminal justice
practitioners need to close
their eyes and imagine the
following scenario: thomas
Jefferson, with the Declara-
tion of independence in
hand, is racing through the
streets of Philadelphia in his
late 18th century-style horse-
drawn carriage on his way to
independence hall.  Colonial
law enforcement officers ob-
serve his violation of city speed limits, pull Jefferson’s
carriage to the side of the dirt road, and arrest him.  in
such a situation, what would Jefferson or his colleagues,
who will go on to draft the Bill of rights, consider a rea-
sonable search?  Would they object to the late 20th cen-
tury supreme Court’s reading of the fourth
amendment?  or would the framers have no trouble
with the search of the interior passenger compartment
of Jefferson’s carriage, as well as any wig boxes they
may find therein? 
this colonial criminal procedural issue matters
to criminal practitioners today because it was the ques-
tion on the mind of Justice antonin scalia during the
oral arguments in the Gant case.  in Gant, the supreme
Court was asked to revisit its holding in Belton; in Bel-
ton, the Court defined the constitutional scope of the ex-
ception to the fourth amendment’s Warrant Clause for 
searches of vehicles incident to a lawful arrest of their
occupants.  at issue before the Court in Gant was the 
continuing viability of the Belton doctrine authorizing 
law enforcement officers to search the entire interior
compartment of an automobile, as well as any containers
therein, contemporaneously with the arrest of a recent
occupant of that vehicle.  the automobile arrest excep-
tion to the warrant requirement was intended to protect
the physical safety of the arresting police officers and
to prevent the destruction of evidence inside of the car.
Police, prosecutors, and de-
fense counsel should read the
Gant decision carefully be-
cause the ruling creates a new,
or at least modified, rule for
how such searches may be
constitutionally conducted.
these changes will signifi-
cantly alter how practitioners
conduct litigation in this im-
portant area.
in an effort to decide the
future of Belton, at least one
Justice considered the
framers’ original intent in
writing the fourth amend-
ment.  Justice scalia became
frustrated with arizona’s reliance on law enforcement’s
use of procedures endorsed in Belton over the almost
three decades since the issuance of that opinion.4 as an
originalist, Justice scalia had a much longer timeline in
mind and was anxious to hear about the framers’ expe-
riences with the issue of searches incident to arrest in
18th century vehicles. “if you stopped thomas Jeffer-
son’s carriage to arrest thomas Jefferson,” Justice scalia
asked of counsel for arizona, “and you pulled him off
to the side of the road, could you . . . then go up and
search his carriage?”5 Justice scalia was disappointed
by arizona’s slightly flummoxed counsel’s inability to
shed any light on the question of what kind of treatment
the primary author of the Declaration of independence
would have expected from colonial law enforcement au-
thorities.6 the significance of Justice scalia’s question
is that it revealed the degree to which he was willing to
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reconsider the well-established precedent of Belton.
scalia was pleading with counsel to give him something
“to hang [his] hat on” from the framers’ original under-
standing of what they may have viewed as a reasonable
search under the “carriage exception” to the warrant re-
quirement.7
this article will consider the state of the post-
colonial law leading up to the Court’s decision in Belton,
the Belton case itself, and its progeny.  then, it will dis-
cuss the arizona supreme Court’s holding and reason-
ing in Gant.  it will analyze the positions on both sides
and analyze the questions that each justice raised during
oral arguments.  it will propose grounds on which the
Court could have decided Gant and assess what each
would have meant for the criminal justice practitioner.
finally, it will discuss the significance of the Court’s rul-
ing in Gant.
in Chimel v. California,9 the United states
supreme Court sought to explain the “search incident to
arrest” exception to the fourth amendment’s warrant
requirement and limit its application to the extent sup-
ported by the rationale for the rule.  armed with a war-
rant for Chimel’s arrest, three police officers went to
Chimel’s home to arrest him for the burglary of a coin
shop.  as he was being arrested, Chimel denied an offi-
cer’s request for permission to search his home.  Despite
Chimel’s refusal to give consent, the officers, citing their
authority to conduct a search incident to the arrest,
searched his home and seized evidence linking him to
the burglary.10
the supreme Court confronted the issue of
whether the search of petitioner’s whole house could be
justified as incident to his lawful arrest therein.11 the
Court expressed its intent to clarify the scope of the
search incident to arrest doctrine, noting that its own ju-
risprudence on the issue had been “far from consis-
tent.”12 the Court began its analysis in Chimel by
rejecting the twenty-eight-year-old standard it had an-
nounced in United States v. Rabinowitz13 to govern the
scope of a warrantless search incident to arrest.  Rabi-
nowitz permitted such a search to extend to the area in
the “possession” or “under the control” of the arrestee.14
noting the broad sense in which the lower court applied
the Rabinowitz standard to petitioner Chimel, the Court
found it neither “historical nor rational.”15
the Chimel Court walked through the various
scenarios typically faced by police officers when mak-
ing an arrest.  it then analyzed the scope of a permissible
search incident to arrest by reference to the rationale for
that search.  thus, the Court found it reasonable for an
officer to search the person of an arrestee in order to
seize any weapons that he may use to threaten the offi-
cer’s safety or “resist arrest or effect his escape.”16 the
Court declared that it was also reasonable to search for
or seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order
to “prevent its concealment or destruction.”17 the Court
then limited the scope of a permissible search beyond
the actual person of the arrestee only to that area to
which these twin rationales apply.18 the area to which
these two rationales apply, the Court held, is that area
“‘within [the arrestee’s] immediate control’ . . . within
which he might gain possession of a weapon or destruc-
tible evidence.”19 the Court thus modified the Rabi-
nowitz standard by forbidding the warrantless search of
any area within the arrestee’s “possession” and narrow-
ing it to that area not merely “under [his] control” but
rather “within his immediate control.”20
setting up the choice as one between “a search
of the person arrested and the area within his reach” on
the one hand and “more extensive searches” on the
other, the Court chose the former.21 the search of
Chimel’s home beyond the area within his immediate
control was unconstitutional if based solely on the
search incident to arrest exception to the warrant clause.
lower courts were left to apply Chimel’s “within
the arrestee’s immediate control” doctrine on a case-by-
case basis.  their efforts to define the permissible scope
of a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest proved
difficult and inconsistent.22 in response to the struggles
of the lower courts, the supreme Court began to adopt
bright-line rules to determine the permissible scope of
searches incident to arrest, at least as it applied to the
timing of the search.  in United States v. Edwards,23 Jus-
tice Byron White, writing for the majority, stated that
“searches and seizures that could be made on the spot
at the time of the arrest may legally be conducted later
when the accused arrives at the place of detention.”24
the Court justified extending the permissible search
doctrine in Edwards because “the normal processes in-
cident to arrest and custody had not yet been completed
when edwards was placed in his cell.”25 this is broad-
ened from the scope of Chimel because at the time re-
spondent was searched, there was neither a danger to the
officer nor a risk of destruction of any evidence—the
original Chimel rationales for the warrantless search.  
in United States v. Robinson,26 the supreme
Court drew another bright-line rule delineating the per-
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missible scope of the search of the person of an arrestee
incident to his arrest.27 in that case, robinson was
legally arrested for driving an automobile after his op-
erator’s permit was revoked.28 During a full custodial
search of robinson’s person, the arresting officer dis-
covered a crumpled up cigarette package containing
packets of heroin in robinson’s breast pocket.29 the ev-
idence was admitted in his trial and led to his conviction
for a narcotics offense.30
for purposes of its analysis, the supreme Court
divided the well-established exception to the warrant re-
quirement for searches incident to arrest into two propo-
sitions: (1) “a search may be made of the person of the
arrestee by virtue of the lawful arrest” alone and (2) “a
search may be made of the area within the control of the
arrestee.”31 the Court contrasted its decisions on these
two propositions noting that the law regarding the search
of the arrestee’s person has been settled and consistently
applied,32 while the extent of the area which may be
searched has been “subject to differing interpreta-
tions.”33
the D.C. Circuit Court had reasoned that even
a search of an arrestee’s person incident to arrest is lim-
ited by the possible presence of weapons or evidence.
it found that there was no reason to expect that evidence
would be revealed by a full body search.34 the Circuit
Court also narrowed the scope of authority to search
based upon a risk of concealment or destruction of evi-
dence to such evidence that may relate to the offense for
which the arrestee was being brought into custody.35 in
reversing the appellate court, the supreme Court em-
phatically rejected a limitation of the search of robin-
son’s person to one only for weapons as well as the
Circuit Court’s “suggestion that there must be litigated
in each case the issue of whether or not there was pres-
ent one of the reasons supporting the authority for a
search of the person incident to a lawful arrest.”36
the Court rejected a standard that would require
a case-by-case, totality of the circumstances analysis to
determine whether the arrestee may pose a threat to the
safety of the officer or be in a position to conceal or de-
stroy specifically relevant evidence.  “the authority to
search the person incident to a lawful custodial arrest,
while based upon the need to disarm and to discover ev-
idence, does not depend on what a court may later de-
cide was the probability in a particular arrest situation
that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon
the person of the suspect.”37 it is the lawful arrest itself
that justifies the search of the arrestee’s person, not the
possibility under the circumstances of the case that
weapons or evidence might be found.38
thus, the Court drew a clear bright-line rule that
allows the police, upon arrest of a person, to conduct a
full search of that person, as well as any containers
found on his person.  of course, the rationale underpin-
ning the rule is the protection of the officer’s safety and
prevention of destruction of any evidence the arrestee
may be carrying.  the permissible scope of the search,
however, is not “narrowly limited by [those] twin ratio-
nales.”39
While the Robinson Court “established an auto-
matic right to search everything found on a person who
has been subjected to a custodial arrest,”40 it was silent
about whether that automatic power extended to con-
tainers or packages found within the arrestee’s “imme-
diate control.”41
in 1981, the supreme Court addressed the issue
of the permissible scope of searches incident to arrests
in automobiles in New York v. Belton.42 on april 9,
1978, respondent roger Belton was riding in an auto-
mobile that sped past state trooper Douglas nicot who
was on routine patrol in an unmarked car on the new
york thruway.43 nicot chased down the car, ordered its
driver to pull over to the side of the road, and found that
the car was occupied by four men, including Belton.44
after requesting the driver’s license and the vehicle reg-
istration, nicot discovered that none of the four men
owned the car.45
While making these routine inquiries, trooper
nicot was able to smell an odor he recognized to be that
of burnt marijuana.46 he saw an envelope on the floor
of the car with the name of a brand of marijuana marked
on it.47 trooper nicot ordered all four men out of the
car and placed each under arrest for unlawful possession
of marijuana.48 after patting down each arrestee, nicot
separated them so that they were unable to reach each
other.49 he then returned to the car and picked up the
envelope in which he found marijuana.50 trooper nicot
then conducted a body search of each of the arrestees.51
he next conducted a search of the entire passenger com-
partment of the car; nicot found a black leather jacket
belonging to Belton on the back seat of the vehicle.52
nicot searched the jacket, unzipped a closed pocket, and
found what he suspected to be cocaine.53 he seized the
jacket and the envelope of marijuana and drove Belton
and the other three arrestees to the closest police sta-
tion.54
new YoRk v. Belton’S “BriGhT-line” rule
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Belton was charged with, and found guilty of,
criminal possession of a controlled substance.55 his pre-
trial motion to suppress the cocaine that trooper nicot
had found in his jacket was denied.56 he appealed the
denial of his motion to the new york Court of appeals
and the Court of appeals reversed.57 the appellate court
held that the search of the jacket and the seizure of the
cocaine were unconstitutional because “there was no
longer any danger that the arrestee or a confederate
might gain access to the article.”58 thus, new york’s
highest court was interpreting the search incident to law-
ful arrest doctrine, as it applies to arrests involving au-
tomobiles, as being limited in scope to the extent
necessary to support its underlying rationales of the ar-
resting officer’s safety or the integrity of any evidence
of criminal activity.  the same rationales would later be
used by the arizona supreme Court
to invalidate the search in Gant.  it
is beyond dispute, of course, that the
search incident to arrest doctrine ap-
plies to arrests made of individuals
who had been riding in automobiles
as much as it does to those merely
walking along the street.  the issue
the supreme Court faced in New
York v. Belton, as expressed by Jus-
tice Potter stewart who authored the
majority opinion, was “[w]hen the
occupant of an automobile is sub-
jected to a lawful custodial arrest,
does the constitutionally permissi-
ble scope of a search incident to his
arrest include the passenger com-
partment of the automobile in which he was riding?”59
this expression of the issue, referring to the scope of ar-
rests in automobiles, implies that there may be a distinc-
tion between the scope of searches permitted incident to
automobile arrests and searches incident to other arrest
scenarios not involving automobiles.  
the supreme Court began its analysis in Belton
by acknowledging the difficulty that courts were expe-
riencing in applying the Chimel rule, especially as it re-
lated to arrests of the occupants of automobiles.  Chimel,
of course, defined the constitutionally permissible scope
of a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest as lim-
ited to the area within the immediate control of the ar-
restee.60 the Court acknowledged, however, that
“courts have found no workable definition of [this area]
when that area arguably61 includes the interior of an au-
tomobile and the arrestee is its recent occupant.”62 the
Court, lamenting that difficulty, extolled the virtues of
a clear set of rules for the fourth amendment that po-
lice, citizens, and courts can easily understand and con-
sistently apply.63 as applied to searches of the person,
such a “straightforward rule, easily applied and pre-
dictably enforced” could be found in the Court’s holding
in United States v. Robinson.64 the Court expressed its
disappointment that no such rule has “emerged from the
litigated cases” regarding the issue in Belton.65
the Court, determined to take the matter into its
own hands, announced two bright-line rules in Belton.
Both rules involved the constitutionally permissible
scope of searches of the surrounding areas of arrestees
who are recent occupants of automobiles.66 the first
rule dealt with the interior compartment of the vehicle
and the second with packages or other containers inside
that passenger compartment. 
as for the first rule, the Court
held that “[i]n order to establish
the workable rule that this cate-
gory of cases requires . . . we hold
that when a policeman has made a
lawful custodial arrest of the occu-
pant of an automobile, he may, as
a contemporaneous incident of
that arrest, search the passenger
compartment of that automo-
bile.”67 the supreme Court re-
jected the argument that the court
below found persuasive: that the
search was unconstitutional be-
cause the four men were no longer
within the reach of the passenger
compartment of the automobile at the time of the search.
the men had been separated and under the control of
the officer early in the encounter.68 Despite the fact that
the officer was outnumbered four to one, there was no
evidence in the record that the occupants posed a danger
to his safety by virtue of a potential weapon in the car.
neither was there any evidence that any of the arrestees
were in a position to destroy or conceal evidence in the
car.  nevertheless, the supreme Court upheld the search
of the entire passenger compartment of the vehicle
which the arrestees had recently occupied based on the
arrest alone.
the second bright-line rule promulgated by Bel-
ton regarded containers in the automobile’s passenger
compartment.  the supreme Court went on to rule that
“[i]t follows from [the conclusion that police officers
may search the passenger compartment of a vehicle] that
7Criminal Law Brief
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tinction between the
scope of searches per-






the police may also examine the contents of any con-
tainers69 found within the passenger compartment, for if
the passenger compartment is within reach of the ar-
restee, so also will containers in it be within his reach.”70
the Court’s imprecise language about the con-
tainers being as much within reach of the arrestee as the
passenger compartment is unfortunate.  it suggests
wrongly that the search of the passenger compartment
is predicated upon it being actually within the reach of
the arrestee; a requirement it has clearly rejected.  how-
ever, the Court assumed that the passenger compartment
and the containers would actually be within reach in
most cases.71 aside from the automobile arrest scenario,
the entire search incident to arrest doctrine assumes the
value of a clear line based upon the danger to the officer
and of the destruction of evidence that is inherent in the
nature of an arrest.  accordingly, a bright-line rule is
needed for “predictability and ease of application.”72
as has been recognized by commentators, the
line can be drawn in any number of different places.
the Belton Court explained that the reason for its place-
ment of the line where it did was that, in reality, the ac-
cessibility of the passenger compartment and containers
therein will be the case more often than not.73 the ma-
jority is making the educated wager that they would
more often be right than wrong; thus justifying those
rare instances in which there are no opportunities for a
suspect to access weapons or evidence.  Whether this is
empirically true, especially at present, is open to ques-
tion.  it may be true that the arrestee may more fre-
quently be in handcuffs in the police car when the search
of the automobile is conducted.  that, of course, was the
issue presented in Gant as will be discussed below.  
two places where the Court did not draw bright-
line rules were the questions of whether arrestees were
“recent occupants” of the vehicle and whether the search
of the car incident to the arrests was “contemporaneous”
with the arrests themselves.  fleshing out these two tem-
poral requirements has led to considerable litigation and
served to protect and justify the rationales of officer
safety and protection of any evidence in the car.  the
temporal requirements go a long way to confirming the
continued viability of the rationales while maintaining
the bright-line rules regarding the scope of the search.74
an alternative to the bright-line rule would have
been a holding that a search of an automobile’s interior
and any containers therein can be conducted only if the
recent occupants pose an actual, provable threat to the
safety of the police officer or to the integrity of any ev-
idence of the suspected crime or otherwise.  this stan-
dard, however, would have proven confusing and po-
tentially dangerous for police to apply.75 it would have
required trial courts to undertake a case-by-case evalu-
ation of when, during the course of each particular arrest
situation, either a threat to the officer or to the integrity
of the evidence existed.  any search of a car and con-
tainers therein would no longer be permissible once both
of the twin dangers had subsided.  such a determination
would involve factual hearings at which the court would
have to make fine distinctions.  Prosecutors, police, de-
fense counsel, and judges would need to be prepared for
additional litigation in most, if not all, car arrest cases.76
in addition to these difficult factual determinations,
there would still be a need for findings on the twin
Chimel rationales.  
the supreme Court went on in several other
cases to reaffirm its holding and rationale for the bright
line rules it announced in Belton.77 almost every court
that has considered the bright-line rules at both the fed-
eral and state levels has acknowledged and adopted the
bright-line rules without regard to limitations imposed
by the need to satisfy the underlying rationales.78 some
state courts have declined to follow Belton’s lead regard-
ing the bright-line rules when they are interpreting their
own state constitutions.79 some other courts, while ac-
cepting the constitutional ruling in Belton, have found
it inapplicable for a variety of reasons.80 some expert
commentary has defended the bright-line rules of Bel-
ton81 while a considerable amount has been generally
critical of the Court’s approach.82
twenty-three years after its opinion in Belton,
and just four years before granting certiorari in Gant,
the supreme Court took up a case resembling the hypo-
theticals that Justice Brennan’s dissent proffered in Bel-
ton and brightened the bright-line rule it drew in that
case.  the issue presented in Thornton v. United States
was whether the rule in Belton “is limited to situations
where the officer makes contact with the occupant while
the occupant is inside the vehicle, or whether it applies
as well when the officer first makes contact with the ar-
restee after the latter has stepped out of his vehicle.”84
the answer the Court provided to that question under-
scores the conclusion that a search incident to the arrest
of a recent occupant of a vehicle does not depend on the
arrestee’s actual ability to reach weapons or evidence in
the passenger compartment.
thRonton v. United StAteS83
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norfolk, virginia Police officer Deion nichols
was in uniform driving an unmarked police car when he
noticed petitioner thornton driving a lincoln town
Car.85 officer nichols observed thornton slow down
and avoid driving directly next to nichols’ car, and sus-
pected that thornton recognized him to be a police of-
ficer and that he was trying to hide something from
him.86 nichols pulled over, noted the license plate of
thornton’s car, and found that they were registered to a
different model car.87
Based on this information, nichols prepared to
pull thornton over.88 Before he was able to do so,
thornton pulled off the road into a parking lot and got
out of the vehicle.89 officer nichols parked behind
thornton, stopped him as he was walking away from
his car, and asked for his license.90 nichols thought that
thornton appeared nervous—thornton began speaking
incoherently, sweating, and licking his lips.91 thinking
thornton could be armed and dangerous, officer
nichols asked whether thornton was carrying a weapon
or drugs on his person or in his car.92 thornton denied
possessing either and agreed to the officer’s request to
perform a frisk search.93 During the search, nichols felt
a bulge in thornton’s left front pocket.94 nichols again
asked thornton if he was carrying any illegal drugs, and
this time thornton admitted that he was.95 nichols then
removed two separate bags from thornton’s pocket: one
contained a large amount of crack cocaine and the other
contained three smaller bags of marijuana.96 thornton
was handcuffed, placed under arrest, and put in the back
seat of the police car.97 only then did officer nichols
search thornton’s car, in which he found a gun under
the driver’s seat.98
thornton was arrested and charged with posses-
sion of cocaine with the intent to distribute, possession
of a firearm during a drug trafficking offense, and pos-
session of a firearm by a convicted felon.99 thornton’s
motion to suppress the firearm and other evidence was
denied, and he was convicted of all three counts.100 on
appeal, the United states Court of appeals for the sec-
ond Circuit rejected thornton’s argument that Belton
was limited to situations in which police first make con-
tact with an arrestee while he is still in the car.101
in Belton, the officer made first contact with the
arrestee while he was still in his vehicle, ordered him to
get out of the car, and then placed him under arrest.102
thus, the fact that the arrest was made outside of the ve-
hicle, as was the case in Thornton, did not preclude a
search of the car incident to that arrest.  the Thornton
Court reasoned that the issue was not whether the arrest
was made outside of the car—that scenario was settled
by law.103 the issue was whether there is a constitu-
tional distinction over whether first contact between the
officer and the suspect takes place after the suspect gets
out of the car on his own initiative or at the officer’s di-
rection.104
the Court rightly and quickly dispensed with
this issue in favor of the government.105 it would be sur-
prising for the Court to conclude that the legality of a
search depends on whether the arrestee exited his car by
choice or at the order of an officer, especially consider-
ing the search of an arrestee’s car is legal even if arrested
outside of the vehicle. 
What is more significant about Thornton, for our
purposes, is the issue of thornton’s proximity to the car
and other circumstances at the time of his arrest and the
search of the car.  the important issue is not why thorn-
ton got out of the car, but where he was at the time
nichols searched the car and whether the officer’s safety
or potential evidence was threatened by thornton after
being arrested, handcuffed, and placed in the patrol car.
the circuit court correctly applied Belton below, and the
supreme Court did not directly address the question, as-
suming that this was not an issue.  the Court interpreted
Thornton on the much more narrow, and more easily de-
cided, issue of whether the place of first contact is con-
stitutionally significant for the validity of the search.106
in Belton, the Court “placed no reliance” on the
fact that the officer had “ordered the occupants out of
the vehicle, or initiated contact with them while they re-
mained within it.”107 the Thornton Court stated that it
did not “find such a factor persuasive in distinguishing
the current situation, as it bears no logical relationship
to Belton’s rationale.”108 Pointing to the rationale of Bel-
ton, the Court concluded that, in determining the area
within the arrestee’s immediate control, it makes no dif-
ference “whether the arrestee exited the vehicle at the
officer’s direction, or whether the officer initiated con-
tact with him while he remained in the car.”109 the
Court then analyzed the issue as such: identical concerns
regarding officer safety and the destruction of evidence
exist regardless of whether “the arrest [is of] a suspect
who is next to a vehicle . . . [or] of one who is inside the
vehicle.”110 While the Court posed the issue as whether
the officer ordered respondent out of the car or whether
he got out on his own, the Court based its analysis on
whether the arrest was made outside or inside the car.
such an approach moves the issue closer to the question
addressed in Gant.
the Thornton Court observed that the danger
9Criminal Law Brief
sought to be addressed in Belton was “the fact of the ar-
rest.”111 given an arrest, the likelihood of getting a
weapon or destroying evidence is the same whether or
not the arrestee exited before the officer initiated contact
and is “outside of, but still in control of” the vehicle.112
the Constitution does not require officers to risk their
safety or the destruction of evidence by a “contact initi-
ation” rule.  
of course, the Belton requirement that the ar-
restee be a “recent occupant” of the automobile would
remain viable.  Whether an arrestee is a “‘recent occu-
pant’ may turn on his temporal or spatial relationship to
the car at the time of the arrest and search,” the Court
explained.113 it then went on to imply that the temporal
and spatial factors that may determine whether someone
is a recent occupant need not ex-
ceed those of Belton, stating that
“not all contraband in the passen-
ger compartment is likely to be
readily accessible to a ‘recent oc-
cupant,’” and “[i]t [was] unlikely
in this case that petitioner could
have reached under the driver’s
seat for his gun once he was out-
side of his automobile.”114 the
firearm and passenger compart-
ment in general, however, were
no more inaccessible than were
the contraband and the passenger
compartment in Belton.  the
need for a clear rule that would be readily understood
by officers and would not be dependent on differing es-
timates of what items were within reach of an arrestee
at any particular moment justifies the sort of generaliza-
tion that Belton enunciated.  once officers determine
that there is probable cause for an arrest, “it is reason-
able to allow officers to ensure their safety and to pre-
serve evidence by searching the entire passenger
compartment.”115
the thornton concurrence authored by Justice
scalia and joined by Justice ginsburg offers an alterna-
tive standard and gives some insight into why the Court
granted certiorari in the Gant case.  the concurrence
skips the issue the Court addresses regarding the when,
where, and why of initial contact, and instead considers
the circumstances at the time of the actual search.  it be-
gins with Chimel’s “immediate control” standard gov-
erning the scope of a search incident to a lawful arrest
to find weapons or evidence.116 Thornton notes the ra-
tionale as the need for covering that area into which an
arrestee might reach, and explains that the Belton bright-
line rule in automobile arrests is justified because the
passenger compartment is “generally, even if not in-
evitably within the arrestee’s immediate control.”117
scalia notes that thornton was not in or near the
car; instead, he was handcuffed and secured in the back
of the police car at the time of the search.118 the risk
that thornton could reach a weapon or evidence was
“remote in the extreme” compared to the more danger-
ous location of the arrestees in Belton. 119 “the Court’s
effort to apply our current doctrine to this search
stretches it beyond its breaking point,” wrote scalia.120
the concurrence identified and rejected three
possible justifications for the Thornton search based on
the two Chimel rationales:
1.  the arrestee may escape and
get a gun or evidence from the car.
this feat, scalia writes, would be
consistent with Judge goldberg’s
“mythical arrestee ‘possessed of the
skill of houdini and the strength of
hercules.’”121
2.  if the officer could have made
the search at the time of the actual ar-
rest near the car then he should be
able to make it after he sensibly se-
cures the arrestee.  scalia argues that
the search is not an inevitable enti-
tlement but rather an exception to a
rule justified by the necessity of pro-
tecting the officer and the evidence, the absence of
which would otherwise make the search unlawful.122
3.  although neither danger was present in this
case, Belton searches are reasonable under the fourth
amendment.  it is better to have a bright-line rule even
if some are not reasonable on their particular facts.123
as a practical matter, it is very common to have
the arrestee in handcuffs in the squad car precisely in
order to neutralize him as a threat to the officer or to ev-
idence.  scalia correctly noted that cases upholding such
searches are multitudinous and that courts have upheld
searches where the arrestee is driven away from the
scene.124 today’s police training makes this type of
search routine.125 it is no longer accurate to assume, as
Belton did, that the arrestee will generally, if not always,
have access to the passenger compartment and its con-
tainers for very long.  the concurring justices correctly
concluded that this is no longer the case in light of police
adaptation to the Belton rule.
however, Belton may be justifiable, writes
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scalia, simply because the car may contain evidence of
the crime for which the person was arrested.126 scalia’s
concurrence intimates that it is reasonable to search for
evidence of a crime when and where the person is ar-
rested for that crime.  But the narrower Chimel rule, he
notes, also has historical support.127 therefore, either
the Rabinowitz or Chimel rules represent plausible
means of analysis.  indicating his discomfort with Bel-
ton, scalia writes that its historical support is based only
on stare decisis.128 scalia further writes that Belton can-
not be explained as an application of Chimel.129 rather,
it is a return to broader pre-Chimel authority limited to
automobiles because of a reduced expectation of privacy
and heightened law enforcement needs.  returning to
this “evidence of the crime” standard would help recon-
cile Robinson (police may search the person incident to
arrest without regard to presence or absence of either
Chimel rationale because the fact of the arrest alone is
enough justification) and Rabinowitz (the arrest itself is
not enough to justify the search but the search is justified
based on a reasonable belief that evidence would be
found).130
scalia concludes by offering a new standard
based on, but limiting, Belton: “[we] would therefore
limit Belton searches to cases where it is reasonable to
believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be
found in the vehicle.”131 Pursuant to an arrest for a drug
offense it is entirely reasonable to believe that the car
from which the arrestee emerged and was still close to
could contain further contraband or other similar related
evidence.  this standard still leaves a number of ques-
tions unanswered and would require additional and ex-
tensive fact-finding hearings by the trial court as it
considers the issue on a case-by-case basis.132
Justice stevens’ dissent, to which Justice souter
joined, emphasizes the fact that first contact occurred
when thornton was out of the car.  thornton was essen-
tially an “arrested pedestrian.”133 the dissent argues that
Chimel alone is enough to govern this situation because
it is no longer an automobile arrest.  the same protec-
tions should apply to a recent occupant of a vehicle as
to a recent occupant of a house.  the majority, stevens
writes, “[e]xtends Belton’s reach without providing any
guidance for the future application of its swollen
rule.”134
the opinions in Thornton reveal uneasiness with
Belton by at least five justices: scalia, ginsburg,
stevens, souter and o’Connor.  in light of this, one can
ask why the Court did not address the Belton issue in its
2004 Thornton opinion.  like gant, thornton was in
handcuffs in the rear of the patrol car at the time of the
search.  Perhaps buyer’s remorse after Thornton helps
explain why the Court decided to grant certiorari in
Gant.
During the daylight hours of august 25, 1999,
two uniformed officers of the tucson police department
knocked on the door of a house in response to a tip that
activities involving illegal narcotics were taking place
inside.136 rodney gant answered the door.137 the police
officers asked to speak to the owner of the residence,
and gant responded by telling them that the owner was
away and would return later in the afternoon.138 Before
returning that evening, the officers learned that there
was an outstanding warrant for gant’s arrest for driving
with a suspended license.139 While the officers were in
the process of making arrests outside the front of the res-
idence, gant drove up and parked his car in the drive-
way.140  as gant got out of the car, an officer
immediately called him over, intending to place him
under arrest based on the outstanding warrant.141 gant
walked eight to twelve feet from the car toward the of-
ficer, and an officer handcuffed him and placed him
under arrest.142 Within moments, gant was seated in the
back seat of the patrol car under the supervision of an
officer.143 two other officers, pursuant to their training
in the permissible scope of a search incident to a lawful
automobile arrest, searched the passenger compartment
of the car that gant had been driving just moments be-
fore.144 in the course of that search, the officers found a
small plastic bag of cocaine and a pistol.145 Contem-
poraneously, two others had also been arrested and
placed in the back seats of two other police vehicles.146
in all, four officers were present at the scene, which was
considered secure.147
the procedural history of the case is less simple.
Based on the bag of drugs, gant was charged with pos-
session of a controlled substance and possession of drug
paraphernalia.148 the trial court denied gant’s motion
to suppress both the drugs and the bag.149 Consequently,
gant was convicted of both counts.150 on appeal, the
arizona Court of appeals reversed the denial of gant’s
motion to suppress.151 the arizona supreme Court de-
nied review but the United states supreme Court
granted the state’s petition for certiorari.152 the
supreme Court vacated the opinion of the Court of ap-
peals and remanded for reconsideration in light of a rel-
evant case that had been decided by the arizona
ARizonA v. GAnt: The CaSe BelOW135
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supreme Court in the interim.153 that interim case, State
v. Dean,154 held that if an arrestee is not a recent occu-
pant of the car from which he is arrested then Belton
does not apply.155 the Court of appeals remanded
gant’s case to the trial court for determination of
whether gant was a “recent occupant” under state and
federal law.  the trial court found that gant was, in fact,
a recent occupant and again upheld the search and ad-
mission of the evidence.156 gant again appealed to the
arizona Court of appeals, which again reversed on
grounds that the search was not “contemporaneous”
with gant’s arrest and that the two rationales were not
present for the automobile search incident to a lawful
arrest exception to the warrant requirement of Chimel.157
the state appealed to the arizona supreme Court,
which affirmed,158 and the United states supreme Court
granted the state’s second petition for certiorari.159
the arizona supreme Court posed the issue in
Gant as follows: does the search incident to arrest ex-
ception permit the warrantless search of an arrestee’s car
“when the scene is secure and the arrestee is handcuffed,
seated in the back of a patrol car, and under the super-
vision of a police officer”?160 the court held that under
such circumstances such a search is not justified.161 By
framing the issue as it did, the arizona supreme Court
distinguished Belton on its facts.  more difficult was dis-
tinguishing Thornton, the facts of which are essentially
identical to those in Gant. the arizona supreme Court
unpersuasively argued that the only issue the petitioners
raised in Thornton was the significance of when first
contact occurs and that the Thornton Court could not
and did not reach the issue presented in Gant.
Before the arizona supreme Court, the state ar-
gued gant’s case was an easy one because Belton and
Thornton were controlling.162 But unlike Belton, the
court held that this case did not deal with the permissible
scope of a search of an automobile incident to a contem-
poraneous arrest of a recent occupant but “with the
threshold question whether the police may conduct a
search incident to arrest at all when the scene is se-
cure.”163 “Because Belton does not purport to answer
this question,” the arizona supreme Court claimed, “we
must determine whether officer safety or the preserva-
tion of evidence, the rationales that excuse the warrant
requirement for searches incident to arrest, justified the
warrantless search of gant’s car.”164
the arizona supreme Court read the record as
showing that the scene was completely secure.165 there
was no reason to think anyone had access to the passen-
ger compartment or that the safety of the officers or any
evidence was at risk.  the arizona supreme Court held
that “absent either of these Chimel rationales, the search
cannot be upheld as a lawful search incident to arrest.”166
the arizona supreme Court claimed that Gant
did not require it to “reconsider Belton” because the
facts were very different.167 it made no effort, therefore,
to offer arguments for abandoning the rule of stare de-
cisis.  in Belton, the court emphasized that there was one
officer and four unsecured suspects outside the car168
thereby putting the safety of the officer and the integrity
of the evidence at risk.  therefore, the Chimel reasons
for a search of the passenger compartment incident to
arrest were at hand in Belton, unlike in Gant.169 the
court read Belton as first requiring, as a threshold issue,
the determination of one or both Chimel conditions to
justify a search at all and then, if one condition applies,
imposing a bright-line rule solely on the scope of the
search.170
the state used the Belton rationale to argue that
because the passenger compartment is usually within
reach of an arrestee, it is unnecessary to analyze the ex-
igency in each case.  the court incorrectly held, how-
ever, that at least one exigency is necessary or it would
be permissible to search the car an hour later, a result
that was rejected in Chimel.  the state further argued
that under Robinson, the Chimel justifications are pre-
sumed to exist by virtue of the arrest itself and that the
prosecution need not show actual danger in order to
search a car.171
the arizona supreme Court rejected these argu-
ments.  it wrote that Robinson instead teaches that police
can perform a search incident to arrest without proving
in any particular case that they were concerned about
safety or evidence because it is presumed present in
every arrest.172 But if those concerns “are no longer
present,” then the justifications are absent and a warrant
is required.173 according to the arizona supreme Court,
potential danger to safety and evidence is a presumption
that can be rebutted by the defense, even if it is a search
of arrestee’s person not involving a vehicle.  the burden
is then shifted to the government to prove that either a
threat to the officer’s safety or to the integrity potential
evidence was indeed present in order to take advantage
of the Belton warrant exception.174
the arizona supreme Court recognized that
most other courts have found Belton and Thornton dis-
positive on similar facts,175 but the court did not read
them as abandoning the Chimel justifications for war-
rantless searches incident to lawful arrests in automo-
biles.  the majority acknowledged the need for clear,
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understandable rules in this area and noted the opposi-
tion of arizona law enforcement to any changes in Bel-
ton search procedures.176 the majority, however,
rejected the warnings that law enforcement will “game”
the rules and will not secure the arrestee until the search
is done, and thus risk putting themselves in jeopardy.177
no other theories were advanced or relied upon, such as
the automobile or impoundment exceptions, to justify
the warrantless search. 
the en banc opinion of the arizona supreme
Court in Gant was decided by a 3-2 vote.  Justice W.
scott Bales authored the dissenting opinion and con-
cluded that the majority’s reasoning was inconsistent
with Belton.  there are “good reasons to reconsider Bel-
ton,” he wrote, but “doing so is the sole prerogative of
the United states supreme Court.”178 the dissent re-
jected the majority’s claim that Bel-
ton and Thornton do not control.179 it
did not read Belton as requiring a
threshold finding of one of the
Chimel factors to justify a Belton
search.  
the dissent persuasively sur-
veyed the arguments against the ma-
jority’s conclusions.  according to
the dissent, Belton was an extension
of Chimel and Robinson.  in Robin-
son, searches of a person incident to
arrest are permissible regardless of
whether, in a particular case, “there
was present one of the reasons sup-
porting the [exception to the warrant
requirement].”180 the lawful arrest
itself justifies the search.  “[t]he au-
thority to search the person incident
to a lawful custodial arrest, while based upon the need
to disarm and to discover evidence, does not depend on
what a court may later decide was the probability in a
particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence
would . . . be found.”181
the dissent writes that the supreme Court de-
fined the area of immediate control with the generaliza-
tion that the passenger compartment and any containers
therein may be searched contemporaneously to the ar-
rest of a recent automobile occupant.182 it was therefore
permissible to search containers, including containers
that could not hold weapons or evidence of the crime
for which the arrest was made.183
according to the dissent, the majority erred in
holding that the search was not incident to gant’s lawful
arrest.  it explained that the court was wrong because
the validity of a Belton search does not depend on the
presence of Chimel rationales in a particular case.184 the
new york state Court of appeals in Belton made the
same mistake and the supreme Court corrected that
error.185 Brennan’s dissent in Belton showed that he
knew exactly what the majority was doing.186 Brennan
observed that “[t]he Court today substantially expands
the permissible scope of a search incident to a lawful ar-
rest by permitting police officers to search areas and
containers the arrestee could not possibly reach at the
time of arrest.”187
the majority in Gant took issue with the Belton
majority in the same way Brennan did in his dissent.
Brennan unsuccessfully argued that “[w]hen the arrest
has been consummated and the arrestee safely taken into
custody, the justifications underlying
Chimel’s limited exception to the
warrant requirement cease to apply:
at that point there is no possibility
that the arrestee could reach weapons
or contraband.”188 Based on Bren-
nan’s dissent in Belton, it is hard to
understand how the Gant majority
could adopt an interpretation that the
Belton majority specifically rejected.
in his dissent in the arizona
supreme Court, Bales wrote that
“Belton is also inconsistent with the
majority’s focus on the Chimel ratio-
nales at the time of the search.”189 in
Belton, the search did not take place
until the officer had already removed
the defendant from the car.190 the
Belton Court did not then look to see
if either of the Chimel rationales was present at that
point.  it stated that the search was justified by the arrest
itself.  the Court in Belton held that the arrest was jus-
tified because of circumstances thought generally to
exist during the arrest of a recent occupant, not on any
particularized concerns for safety or evidence.  even the
jacket in the passenger compartment was ruled to be
within Belton’s “immediate control” for the purpose of
a search incident to arrest.191
Justice Brennan recognized that under the ruling
in Belton, “the result would presumably be the same
even if [the officer] had handcuffed Belton and his com-
panions in the patrol car before placing them under ar-
rest.”192 nearly every appellate court that has since
considered the issue has confirmed Brennan’s point.193
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this does not, as the majority claims, mean that
police officers may conduct warrantless searches hours
and miles removed from the arrest.  Belton makes clear,
and the Gant majority does not disagree, that the car
searched must be that of a “recent occupant” and come
“as a contemporaneous incident” of the arrest.194 the
arrestee need not be in the car nor must the search be si-
multaneous to the arrest as long as there is some tem-
poral proximity.195
Bales recognized that the arizona supreme
Court majority created a new test that ignored Belton’s
determination that searches in this context should be
guided by a “straightforward rule” that does not depend
on case-by-case adjudications.  the arizona supreme
Court majority says that a Belton search is not justified
unless, “based on the totality of the circumstances,”
there is a reasonable risk to the officer’s safety or preser-
vation of evidence.196 such an inquiry can only be made
on a case-by-case basis, first by police officers and then
by the trial and reviewing courts.197 this practical result
is at odds with the core motivation of Belton: to develop
a clear rule not dependent on differing estimates of what
items were and were not within reach of an arrestee at
any particular moment.198 this imperative justifies the
sort of generalization which Belton enunciated.
Belton already requires some case-by-case
analysis of the totality of the circumstances itself
through the twin requirements that the arrestee is a re-
cent occupant and that the search is contemporaneous
with the arrest.199 these are threshold requirements that
trigger the right to conduct a Belton search of a car, the
scope of which is the passenger compartment and any
containers.  these determinations certainly do not mean
that there must be case-specific findings of exigent cir-
cumstances at the time of the search.  in fact, it suggests
the contrary.  
Justice Bales did add that the Belton bright-line
rule “has long been criticized and probably merits re-
consideration.”200 the bright-line rule, he wrote, created
“a significant exception to the fourth amendment’s
warrant requirement by making a generalization about
the exigencies of arrests involving automobiles and then
allowing searches whether or not the concerns justifying
the exception were present in any particular case.”201
Bales criticizes Belton as resting on a “shaky founda-
tion” that has gotten more tenuous over time because
police now routinely arrest and handcuff arrestees be-
fore conducting Belton searches.202
there are, however, alternative ways of dealing
with Belton’s weaknesses other than the majority’s
method.  one such alternative, Bales suggested, would
have been for the arizona supreme Court to ground its
holding in the arizona state constitution rather than the
United states Constitution, as some other state courts
have done.203
as will be discussed below, the certiorari peti-
tion and the oral argument revealed that the Court was
interested in reassessing the twenty-eight-year-old hold-
ing in Belton, as well as the four-year-old holding in
Thornton.  that subsequent interest still does not ex-
plain, however, the arizona supreme Court’s disregard
of the established precedent in Belton and Thornton.
the arizona court’s reinterpretation of the Belton doc-
trine was too clever by half and unjustified wishful
thinking.  it did not distinguish, in any meaningful way,
the facts in Gant from Belton and especially from
Thornton.  in the case of Thornton, it tried to distinguish
on the issue instead.  in the case of Belton, the arizona
court chose to challenge its bright-line rule by arguing
that the placement of the line may be logically inconsis-
tent with the reason for the search in the first place.  the
court’s decision represented a blow to the authority of
the supreme Court of the United states in determining
the meaning of the Constitution of the United states.
the arizona supreme Court could have based its hold-
ing on the arizona state constitution and had its way on
the streets of that state.  the court chose, however, to
flaunt its rejection of Belton and throw a gauntlet before
the U.s. supreme Court.  the supreme Court’s subse-
quent willingness to revisit Belton is no excuse for the
arizona supreme Court’s judicial insubordination.  it
should have applied the law and let gant seek certiorari
in the supreme Court.
in its petition for a writ of certiorari, the state
of arizona argued, rightly in our view, that the arizona
supreme Court’s opinion in Gant not only conflicted
with, but actually sought to overrule Belton and Thorn-
ton.  By substituting a “factual assessment in every case
[of] whether the justifications underlying the search in-
cident to arrest actually exist,”205 the Gant court “con-
tradicts and effectively ‘overrules’” Belton206 and
“directly contradicts [its] language and spirit.”207 the
supreme Court rejected this case-by-case analysis in
Belton, a rejection reaffirmed in Thornton under nearly
identical facts.208 arizona asked the supreme Court to
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take the case because the ruling “conflicts with the hold-
ings of nearly every state and federal court that has ap-
plied Belton and Thornton to factual situations like
gant’s.”209 it repeatedly argues that the Gant “case-spe-
cific assessment of actual risks to officers and evidence”
is “unworkable for the very reasons that [the supreme]
Court has repeatedly cited in support of a bright-line
rule.”210 the Gant decision “thwarts” the Court’s efforts
to impose a “straightforward rule, easily applied, and
predictably enforced.”211
in opposition to arizona’s request to hear the
case, respondent gant took a slightly different tack than
did the arizona supreme Court.  gant’s pleading relied
more heavily on the claim that the search of his car was
not a “contemporaneous incident” of the arrest as re-
quired in Belton.212 By framing the issue as whether a
Belton requirement of “contemporaneousness” was met,
gant gave the Court the opportunity to decide the case
without challenging Belton directly.  gant agreed with
the arizona supreme Court, however, that the opinion
did not overrule or even contradict Belton and Thornton
and that it was “consistent with the constitutional prin-
ciples affirmed in Chimel v. California.”213 the pleading
accused arizona of “abandon[ing] fourth amendment
protections by misapplying Chimel and Belton,”214 de-
scribing its interpretation as “fundamentally flawed.”215
he quoted Justice o’Connor’s concurrence in Thornton,
saying that exigent circumstances attendant at arrests of
recent automobile occupants “[did] not create an ab-
solute and continuing right of law enforcement to con-
duct a search of the vehicle.”216
gant supported the arizona supreme Court’s
reasoning that a finding of at least one of the two Chimel
rationales was a prerequisite for searching the car at all
and that the Belton bright-line rule applied only to the
scope of the subsequent search.   Under gant’s interpre-
tation of the Belton rule, there was no threat to the safety
of the officers or the integrity of evidence in the vehi-
cle.217
there are two possible reasons why the supreme
Court granted certiorari in the Gant case.  one is that
the Court planned to reaffirm the rulings in Belton and
Thornton and noticeably correct the arizona supreme
Court for its novel and unprecedented misapplication of
Belton. the Court may have thought it necessary to
send a message, both to the arizona supreme Court and
other courts around the country that have strayed from
its teaching, and to remind them that the bright-line rule
imposed by Belton remained the law of the land.  there
have been few cases other than Gant, however, in which
federal circuit courts or state courts of last resort have
rejected or strayed from Belton.218
another possible reason is that the Court was
willing to reconsider, or at least reexamine, its holding
in Belton, even after refusing to take such an opportunity
just four years prior when it was arguably presented in
Thornton.  in light of each justice’s previously expressed
views on Belton and the concerns expressed in the oral
arguments, it was clear that there was a genuine discom-
fort with Belton.  But while a desire to reconsider its
bright-line rule may have motivated its decision to grant
certiorari in Gant, none of the factors that are usually
present when the supreme Court grants certiorari to re-
consider a well-established case were present in Gant.
there was no major split among courts considering the
issue, there had been substantial reliance on Belton, Bel-
ton had not been ignored or proven unworkable, and
there had been no subsequent supreme Court cases un-
dermining Belton.
in its brief on the merits, petitioner arizona re-
iterated that Belton does not require a fact-bound assess-
ment of either of the Chimel rationales. it went on to
argue that “searches conducted under Belton’s bright-
line rule are reasonable” and that such a limited search
“correctly balances the need for officer safety and evi-
dence preservation with an arrestee’s limited privacy in-
terest in his automobile.”219 arizona added the fanciful
argument, however, that there is in fact a reasonable
danger that gant could have escaped from the police car
and posed a threat to the officers or the evidence.220 ari-
zona’s brief went on to argue that Belton already an-
swered the question presented in Gant, that Thornton
recently reaffirmed this answer, and that principles of
stare decisis favored affirming it once again.221 the es-
tablished rule should be affirmed because it has proven
to be “workable,” it “protects fourth amendment inter-
ests” and there is “no special justification . . . to overrule
it.”222 further, abandoning the Belton rule would pose
a “special hardship” for police officers and departments
which would be forced to develop and retrain new pro-
cedures in order to account for the ramifications of the
Gant opinion.223
gant’s brief again argued that the arizona
supreme Court did not contradict Belton or Thornton
and asserted that “all searches incident to arrest must
rest on Chimel’s twin exigency rationales” under those
cases.224 such searches include those of the arrestee’s
person as well as the area that is reasonable within reach.
the bright-line rules of Belton and Thornton delineate
the scope of the permissible search. Police may search
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the entire passenger compartment of an automobile
“when any part of the car is arguably within the imme-
diate control of its recent occupant.”225 in this case no
such argument can be made, gant concludes.  he points
out factual determinations are still required in order to
determine whether the arrestee is a “recent occupant”
and whether the search is a “contemporaneous incident”
of the arrest.226 he argues in the alternative that if the
arizona supreme Court opinion amounted to a contra-
diction of Belton and Thornton, the Court should indeed
reconsider the holdings in those cases.227 gant therefore
concluded by pointing out that searches of automobiles
pursuant to arrest of a recent occupant are not per se rea-
sonable.228
the oral arguments on october 7, 2008, were
lively, with many justices who were critical of Belton
showing some degree of willingness to reconsider it.
the justices peppered the three attor-
neys (the United states appeared as
an amicus) with questions.  never-
theless, the government counsel
poorly handled the oral arguments.
first, arizona and the United states
were not adequately prepared to
argue the reasonableness of the Bel-
ton approach under the fourth
amendment’s reasonableness
Clause.  Justice scalia wanted infor-
mation on the historic reasonableness
of the practice and neither attorney
was prepared to provide any.229 sec-
ond, the two governments also wasted a lot of time and
credibility on the notion that the Chimel rationales con-
tinue to apply even when arrestees are in cuffs in the po-
lice car.230 they emphasized statistics showing that
suspects occasionally escape from the back of squad
cars despite being handcuffed and could, therefore, ac-
tually pose a danger to the officers or evidence.231 not
only did this waste valuable argument time, but it was
also inconsistent with the crux of their argument.232 the
Court was surprised by this strategy and did not buy the
argument.233 lastly, the government argued for the ap-
plication of Belton and Thornton when it should have
been putting the burden on gant to justify the arizona
court’s rejection of those precedents.  in doing so, the
government failed to emphasize the importance of sup-
porting Belton based on the doctrine of stare decisis. it
could not provide the Court with the correct standard of
special circumstances required to overturn established
precedent.234
nevertheless, if the justices stayed true to their
voting records in the previous related cases there ap-
peared to be a majority for reversal of the arizona
supreme Court in Gant.  Based on their history, Justices
Kennedy, Breyer, and thomas should have supported
arizona’s view of the permissibility of the search on
stare decisis grounds, if nothing else.235 the two newest
justices, Chief Justice roberts and Justice alito, had not
had occasion to address the issue before Gant, but were
expected to align themselves in the majority on the basis
of stare decisis.236
Kennedy and Breyer’s questions and statements,
however, showed a willingness to revisit Belton’s bright-
line rule and its underlying rationales.237 two more jus-
tices, scalia and ginsburg, were expected to concur in
a judgment to reverse, but on more narrow grounds than
the government argued.238 thus, there were the seeds
reworking the relationship between
Chimel and Belton and an announce-
ment of a new rationale for allowing
Belton-style searches.  there were two
solid votes, Justice stevens and Justice
souter, for the proposition that Belton
requires, as a preliminary matter, a find-
ing of danger to the officer or the evi-
dence in order to conduct a search of the
car and its containers once the arrestee
is outside the car.239
the oral arguments provide fur-
ther clues to the thinking of each justice.
although Chief Justice roberts was not
on the Court for any of the previous relevant cases, he,
nevertheless, indicated his fealty to the Belton precedent
through his questions.  he stated that the purpose of a
bright-line rule was that “you don’t have to justify it in
every particular case” and pointed out that by asking for
a case-by-case inquiry, appellees “[a]re … giving up the
bright-line rule.” 240 “you don’t look at the specific
facts” in such cases, he argued, that’s “[t]he whole point
of a bright line rule.”241 he went on to explore the ram-
ifications of eliminating the bright-line rule, posing hy-
pothetical fact situations.  he asked, “[w]hat if [the
arrestee] is in the back of the car but not handcuffed?”242
roberts continued by stating that “you have exactly the
same case-by-case inquiry that Belton said we are not
going to do . . . .  [i]n Thornton of course [the arrestee]
was handcuffed in the back of the police car . . . .  What
is left of the Belton bright-line rule when you are done
. . . .”243 then roberts noted that gant’s argument








rule and its underly-
ing rationales. 
essentially arguing to overrule Belton’s bright-line rule
when he said “in these circumstances Belton applies,
and in these circumstances, it doesn’t.”244
Justice samuel alito was also new to the issue.
his questioning focused on two themes: stare decisis
and the difficulty of adopting a case-by-case approach.
assuming you have to overrule Belton, he asked gant,
“don’t you have to show that there are special circum-
stances justifying the overruling of Belton” such as that
it has been proven unworkable, that it has been under-
mined by subsequent cases, that lower courts have not
relied upon it, or others?245 alito offered a few hypo-
theticals involving the requirements of “recent occu-
pancy” of the car and “contemporaneousness” of the
arrest to show that a case-by-case analysis could prove
problematic.246
after exploring ways to abandon the Belton rule,
while still permitting the search of the automobile on
other grounds, through impoundment, the plain view
doctrine, or pursuant to a warrant, Justice Breyer de-
clared that he found the case “very, very difficult.”247
he was skeptical of the notion that overruling Belton
would prompt the police to intentionally place them-
selves in danger in order to have the authority to search.
he hinted that he would vote to uphold Belton on stare
decisis grounds in the absence of any compelling reason
to overturn it.248 Belton is not very logical, he said, but
it has been the law for almost thirty years and in the ab-
sence of a “disaster” or a “reason it is wrong” he would
not overrule an earlier case.249
Justice anthony Kennedy, as is often his prac-
tice, seemed to be looking for the middle ground.  his
questioning implied that he agreed with gant, that the
Belton bright-line rule requires the support of one of the
Chimel rationales.  he seemed at times to assume that
there was no bright-line rule as of yet and that petition-
ers were asking for one.250 yet he was unpersuaded by
arizona’s argument that there was still a danger to the
officers and a risk of destruction of evidence despite the
arrestee being handcuffed in the police car.251 he ad-
mitted frustration that arizona relied so heavily on this
argument.252 he struggled for an alternative rationale
that he could use to justify a bright-line rule and pointed
towards the car’s mobility, that cars can be stolen or
taken for joy rides, that there may be contraband or
weapons in the car and that other people could get to
them.253
no justice placed more significance on the orig-
inal intent of the framers than Justice scalia.  Justice
scalia was the most active member of the Court during
the oral arguments in Gant.254 Justice scalia had already
shown his discomfort with the Belton bright-line in his
concurrence in Thornton, in which he argued the rule in
Rabinowitz should apply to Belton searches.  Justice
scalia was disappointed that none of the litigants was
able to provide him with anything to “hang [his] hat on,”
by way of evidence that the framers, or any court since
that time, had found the searches allowed under Belton
to be reasonable under the fourth amendment. 255 the
government argued that police had come to rely on Bel-
ton over the nearly three decades since it was decided.256
But scalia was more interested in a longer time frame,
going back to the framers themselves.  Using the exam-
ple of thomas Jefferson’s carriage, he wondered
whether the framers would have considered the Belton
rule to be reasonable under the fourth amendment.257
if so, he asserted, that would be decisive for him in the
Gant case.  the litigants were unable to answer the
question of the framers’ original intent in drafting the
fourth amendment as it would relate to the reasonable-
ness of Belton searches.258
if it is not a reasonable rule, scalia said, then
“it’s just silly.  it’s . . . simply not the case . . . .  i am
going to say, you know, get rid of it.”259 scalia observed
that, realistically, the officer is not at risk if the arrestee
is handcuffed in the police cruiser and the officer
searches his car.260 “[W]hat risk to the officer is being
avoided?”261 he further noted that if you remove the re-
quirement to show a threat to officer safety, “why would
you limit the search just to the passenger compartment
of the vehicle?  Why don’t you let him search the trunk,
too?”262 it is illogical to “abandon the safety require-
ment” and then draw the line so that police cannot
search the whole car.263
scalia again emphasized that the scope of any
search should be limited to evidence of the crime for
which the suspect is being arrested.264 if the arrest is for
speeding, he wondered, what do the police think they
will find by searching the car?265 But, of course, many
traffic arrests initially show no signs of other crimes
until searches of the person and automobile take place.
scalia’s idea to link the arrest with the search for
evidence that would support that arrest was laid out in
his concurrence in Thornton, but neither attorney for the
government seemed prepared to address scalia’s con-
currence.  the government should have prepared its
standard as an alternative to its main argument.  
scalia foresaw that more widespread impound-
ment would constitute a threat to his standard and
would, as a practical matter, be the police reaction to an
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abandonment of the Belton rule.266 But he questioned if
impoundment could always be authorized.267 Why,
asked scalia, must searches of vehicles, but not searches
of the person, be tied to the two reasons?268 Police can
search mother teresa if they arrest her, even though
there is little chance that she is carrying weapons.269
even if it is obvious that there is little to no chance of
hostility in a given situation, there are still bright-line
rules that govern the searches of persons.270 Why not
have a similar rule regarding autos as well?271
Justice ginsburg joined scalia’s Thornton con-
currence, approving of searches for evidence of the
crime for which the suspect is being arrested.  Belton,
she observed, was concerned with weapons and “grab
areas.”272 also, she inquired about impoundment and
subsequent inventory searches.273 she relied on Cham-
bers to draw the line at warrantless station-house im-
poundment searches as unreasonable and asked whether
the facts in Gant were analogous to that situation.274
“[W]hat happens to the car?” she asked.275 Under what
circumstances could the police impound and search the
car?  here the car was on a private driveway.276 Could
police still have impounded and done an inventory
search?277 she astutely took issue with the arizona
supreme Court’s reasoning that it was not overruling
Belton, but merely putting the bright-line rule in con-
text.278 following such reasoning would lead to no
bright-line rules.
Justice stevens, as mentioned above, concurred
in Belton but dissented in Thornton. During oral argu-
ments, he seemed to argue that the traditional automo-
bile exception to the warrant requirement could control
these cases.279 Under the exception, police are entitled
to search an automobile when they have probable cause
to believe it contains contraband, along with any con-
tainers reasonably expected to contain such evidence.280
Why should other cases allow for more extensive
searches on less than probable cause?   
he reminded the litigants that in Belton, the sus-
pects were not under the sort of control that they were
in Thornton and in Gant.281 therefore, he reasoned, ari-
zona and the United states were actually asking for
more than the Court gave in Belton—an “expanded Bel-
ton.”282 there is very little danger to the officers here;
police just “want the ability to search the vehicle.”283
stevens hinted that he would not be inclined to
join the scalia-ginsburg analysis allowing searches for
evidence of the crime in question.  taking issue with the
scalia-ginsburg rationale, he said the scalia-ginsburg
analysis should only control when there is probable
cause to believe there is some evidence in the vehicle.284
Justice souter joined Justice stevens by dissent-
ing in Thornton.  like Justice stevens, Justice souter
was a solid vote for gant.  he was sympathetic to gant’s
view of Belton as being linked to the Chimel rule of an
area within the suspect’s “immediate control” and at
least one of its rationales.  the government’s view,
souter stated, divorces the search completely from the
Chimel rule and concluded that Belton’s bright-line is
dependent upon the presence of one of the two underly-
ing rationales.285 so either we declare it is no longer a
Chimel rule or if we say it applies in a case like this, it
is “nonsense.”286 the choice, he said, was between ap-
plying a new and different rule or applying Chimel.287
responding to the government’s main argument
about the continued existence of the Chimel factors,
souter asked whether in escape cases an officer was ever
injured.288 Did the arrestee “make a beeline — for his
own car?”289 are there any examples “where the ar-
restee went back to his own car and tried to get a gun to
hurt a police officer?”290 Was the arrestee handcuffed?291
Could he still drive the car?292 souter assumed that no
search of the car is permissible on an incident to arrest
theory if the arrestee is in the station house.293 “Why
isn’t it equally workable to say when the [arrestee] is
handcuffed and put in the back of a cruiser, they can’t
do it?” 294
in our view, the U.s. supreme Court had five
possible options for its holding in Gant:
1.  Stare Decisis: reaffirm Belton’s result and 
rationale.  
the Court could have maintained the bright-line
rule that the police may search the entire passenger
compartment of an automobile, including the glove
compartment, as well as any container therein, contem-
poraneous to an arrest of a recent occupant of that vehi-
cle.  the trick would be how to reconcile the ruling with
the obsolete Belton rationale that arrestees will, more
often than not, have access to the compartment and thus
endanger the safety of the officer and integrity of evi-
dence.  instead, the importance of a bright-line rule and
the maintenance of a widely used and easily applied
standard must be emphasized.
the Court could have instructed the arizona
supreme Court and other lower courts that the bright-
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line rule of Belton, as would be reaffirmed in Gant, does
not require specific factual findings of either actual risk
that the police officer(s) may be in danger of harm or
destruction or alteration of evidence as a threshold issue
to conducting a search of the automobile.  the bright
line is drawn by virtue of the arrest itself, defining the
scope of the permissible search as including the passen-
ger compartment and any containers within it.  such a
search is subject only to the limitations that the arrest
must be of “recent occupants” of the car and “contem-
poraneous” to the search as defined by the applicable
body of case law.
this option would have constituted no change
in the way practitioners have dealt with these issues.
the ability to search and the scope thereof would re-
main the same, as would the possibility of litigation re-
garding the recent occupancy of the
vehicle and the contemporaneity of
the search.
2. redraw and redefine the Bright
line.
Under this approach the
Court would have specified the pre-
cise facts that would constitute the
location of the line determining
whether police can conduct a search.
one example is in the facts of Gant
itself: when the suspect is in hand-
cuffs and in the patrol car.  the line
could be re-drawn in any number of
other places and ways, considering
factors such as: when the suspects
are under arrest, when they are in
the squad car, when they are handcuffed, or when they
are removed from the car.  the number of police officers
present must also affect the rules.  
the Court could have avoided overruling Belton
by finding that police procedures developed in response
to Belton undermined the Court’s assumptions of the
circumstances of these searches and now require fine-
tuning of the placement of the line.
this option likely would have created the awk-
ward situation of lines being drawn in different places
under different circumstances.  it would have changed
how practitioners litigate the issues by requiring a find-
ing of whether any of the new factors permitting a
search were present in a given case.
3.  a Chimel-based standard.  
another approach could have been to develop a
new standard based on the twin factors in Chimel.  for
example, the police may search the interior passenger
compartment of an automobile, and any containers
therein, up until the moment that all recent occupants
of an automobile are safely in custody and the automo-
bile is secured.
in other words, it could be lawful to search the
interior compartment of an automobile and any contain-
ers therein, without a warrant, if the government can
show that one or more recent occupants or other persons
posed an actual danger to the officers’ safety or to the
integrity of any evidence.  evidence that the suspects
were safely under arrest or within the control of the po-
lice, or that no one else had access to the car would un-
dermine any ability to establish such dangers.
rebuttable presumptions could
be imposed against either the
defense or the government.
this standard
would address the issue in
Gant and accord with the un-
derlying rationale that there is
a special danger of harm
and/or destruction of evidence
from occupants of automo-
biles. this, of course, would
have required additional litiga-
tion and fact-finding on the
difficult issue of what circum-
stances present a danger to the
officer or evidence. it is possi-
ble, but unlikely, that police
would purposely manage the
arrest scene to maintain threats to themselves or the ev-
idence in order to justify a search of the car.  
Certain basic fact situations would present, how-
ever, some compelling conclusions that may require a
bright-line rule nonetheless.  Would courts find, for ex-
ample, that the existence of just one police officer cre-
ates a per se danger unless the arrestee or arrestees are
handcuffed and secured in a police cruiser?  in such a
situation, an arrestee might run or attack the officer even
if handcuffed.  With this option, police may respond by
developing procedures such that after the arrestee and
the car are secured, they may search the car either
through impoundment or pursuant to a search warrant.
it would be hard to imagine how the Court could
have adopted this approach without overruling Belton
by finding the special circumstances usually required
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The trick would be how
to reconcile the ruling
with the obsolete Belton
rationale that arrestees
will, more often than
not, have access to the
compartment and thus
endanger the safety of
the officer and integrity
of evidence. 
by a departure from stare decisis.  this approach could
also serve to undermine the “search incident to arrest of
a person” doctrine under Robinson and perhaps require
or lead to its modification as well.  rather than always
allowing a full search of the person contemporaneous
to an arrest, a new rule in Gant could presuppose that
such searches require a showing that the suspect posed
an actual risk of harm to the officer or destruction of ev-
idence.  in most cases, the warrantless search incident
to a lawful arrest would be upheld but not before addi-
tional litigation of the facts of each arrest.
4.  evidence of the Crime.  
another possible approach is to adopt the novel
scalia-ginsburg approach that a car search for evidence
of the crime for which the arrest is being made would
be reasonable under the fourth amendment.  this
would open a whole new area of litigation, fact-finding,
and appellate case law as courts struggled with how to
define the permissible scope of such searches.  some of
the questions and issues the courts will face include: for
what crimes is the suspect arrested?  What happens
when multiple suspects are arrested for different of-
fenses?  What sort of evidence is relevant to what sorts
of crimes, for example: is a gun evidence of the crime
of drug possession and vice versa?  is marijuana evi-
dence of driving under the influence?  if the arrest is for
a weapons offense, what is relevant evidence?  Would
any search ever be permissible pursuant to arrests for
traffic offenses?  if not, would that not potentially put
officers in danger of weapons in the car, for example?
Could more complete searches still be conducted if ei-
ther of the Chimel rationales were present?  Where in
the car can be searched?  is the scope governed by the
likelihood of relevant evidence being found?  What
about containers?
5.  other means to the end: Warrants Based Upon Pro
bable Cause or other exceptions
the final alternative would be to abolish any ex-
ception to the warrant clause beyond that involving the
immediate area of control as determined by a Chimel
analysis, and treat recent occupants of cars no differ-
ently than pedestrians or recent occupants of homes.
thus, in order to search the passenger compartment and
any containers therein, the police would need to obtain
a warrant based on probable cause as argued by stevens
and souter. Police could also attempt to justify a search
under some other exception to the warrant requirement.
impoundment would become a regular tactic utilized by
the police and one that would, ironically, constitute a
greater intrusion upon the owner and driver of the car
than would a search at the scene.
it is well established that the Court is free to do
as it pleases, as long as it has five votes.  given the op-
tions above and what occurred during the oral argu-
ments, the Court could have found support for several
outcomes.  Chief Justice roberts, along with Justices
alito, thomas, and perhaps Breyer, could have found
support for option number one, ruling that stare decisis
reverses the arizona supreme Court decision.  also,
there could have been two votes—Justices stevens and
souter—for the warrant-based rule noted in option
five.296 Justices scalia and ginsburg would again pro-
pose their “related evidence” rule but might not attract
any other votes, much less the three more required for a
majority opinion.  as they did in Thornton, however,
these two justices would have likely concurred in the
judgment of at least a stare decisis majority opinion.  
as is so often the case, the most important jus-
tice might have been Justice Kennedy.  Judging from his
questions and comments during the oral argument,
Kennedy may have based the validity of the search on
grounds other than Belton’s familiar bright-line rule.
Justice Breyer confessed discomfort with Belton and in-
dicated his preference for stare decisis.
two months before the end of its 2008–2009
term, the United states supreme Court issued its opinion
in the Gant case. in a 5-4 opinion penned by Justice
stevens, the Court affirmed the holding of the arizona
supreme Court ruling that the evidence seized from re-
spondent’s car was inadmissible.297 the Court held that
the Constitution permitted police to search the passenger
compartment of a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s
arrest only if it is reasonable to believe that the arrestee
might have access to the vehicle at the time of the
search.298   it also created, in a transparent effort to fash-
ion a majority, a wholly new rule for application in such
cases, holding that such a search may also constitution-
ally take place if there is reason to believe that the vehi-
cle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.299 finding
neither condition present in the facts of Gant, the Court
held the search to be unreasonable.300
the Court shed light on its reasons for granting
certiorari in this case citing a “chorus” of courts, schol-
ars, and justices who questioned the clarity of Belton as
well as its fidelity to the fourth amendment.301 in doing
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so, the Court turned a deaf ear to the much louder choir
of consistent conformity to the plain rule in Belton.
Understandably in light of its ruling, the Court
relied heavily on the holding in Chimel and was re-
minded that the exception to the fourth amendment’s
warrant requirement of a search incident to a lawful ar-
rest applies only to “the area from within which [an ar-
restee] might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence.”302 if there is no possibility that
an arrestee can reach into the area that the police seek
to search, the two possible justifications for the excep-
tion are absent. this reasoning, the Court explained, as-
sures that the scope of the search incident to the arrest
is “commensurate with its purposes of protecting arrest-
ing officers and safeguarding any evidence of the of-
fense” that could be concealed or destroyed.303
applying the Chimel exception to the automo-
bile context, Belton, the Court continued, held that
“when an officer lawfully arrests ‘the occupant of an au-
tomobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that
arrest, search the passenger compartment of that auto-
mobile’ and any containers therein.”304 the justifica-
tions of the Chimel warrant exception, said the Gant
Court, apply only when there is a reasonable possibility
of the arrestee gaining access to a weapon or to evidence
in the car.305 the holding in Belton was based in large
part, the Court said, on the assumption that articles in-
side the passenger compartment “are in fact generally,
even if not inevitably, within ‘the area into which an ar-
restee might reach.’”306
Unabashedly seeking to avoid overruling Belton,
the Court rejected the almost universal notion that it had
established a bright-line rule in such cases.  accordingly,
the Court refused to acknowledge that Belton directly
required courts to admit evidence seized from the pas-
senger compartment upon the arrest of recent occupants
of vehicles.307 rather Belton, the Court claimed, has
been widely, though exaggeratedly, read as allowing the
search of the passenger compartment “even if there is
no possibility the arrestee could gain access to the vehi-
cle at the time of the search.”308 the Court attributed
this reading to Justice Brennan’s allegedly hyperbolic
dissent in Belton warning that the majority’s holding in
that case rested on “the ‘fiction . . . that the interior of a
car is always within the immediate control of the ar-
restee’” and that the search would have been upheld
“even if [the officer] had handcuffed Belton and his
companions in the patrol car’ before conducting the
search.”309 the Court acknowledged that cases in which
the searches have been upheld in “this precise factual
scenario . . . are legion.”310 these cases, the Court ad-
mitted, include ones in which the handcuffed arrestee
has already left the scene entirely.311
the Gant Court, disingenuously in our view,
called this common application a “broad reading of Bel-
ton,” one which would “untether the rule from the jus-
tifications underlying the Chimel exception.”312 the
Court accordingly rejected this “broad reading” osten-
sibly without overruling that case.  it held that “the
Chimel rationale authorizes police to search a vehicle
incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only when the ar-
restee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the
passenger compartment at the time of the search.”313 a
search of a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest
is unconstitutional, the Court held, if there was no pos-
sibility of the arrestee gaining access to the interior com-
partment of the vehicle at the time of the search.314
in an effort to distinguish, rather than overrule
Belton, the Court relied heavily on the factual differ-
ences between Belton and Gant.  in Belton, one police
officer—presumably in possession of one pair of hand-
cuffs—was confronted with four unsecured arrestees at
the time of his search of the vehicle.315 in Gant, how-
ever, a total of five police officers handcuffed and se-
cured in a patrol car the lone arrestee, who had recently
occupied the vehicle, and two other suspects.316 the
Court presumed that while Belton may have been able
to access the passenger compartment, gant, on the other
hand, could not have gained access to his car at the time
of the search. 
By so ruling, the Court has left unscathed the re-
sult in Belton under the facts present in that case.  the
Court seemingly fails to realize that these two factual
scenarios represent the polar extremes of a large spec-
trum of real world possibilities.  inexplicably, however,
the Court concluded that it will be “the rare case” in
which an officer is unable to fully effectuate an arrest
so that a real possibility of access to the arrestee’s vehi-
cle remains.317 the Court then foreshadows, without so
acknowledging, the extensive litigation to come over the
factual issue of whether arrestees have a possibility of
access to the passenger compartment.318 it also gives no
weight to subsequent efforts by law enforcement to de-
velop and employ strategies to permit searches of the
passenger compartment by leaving a suspect or suspects
arguably within reach of it.
accordingly, the Court’s ruling leaves many
questions unanswered that criminal justice practitioners
will have to address.  is the ruling in Belton essentially
limited to its specific facts? Does Gant apply only to the
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situation in which the arrestee is handcuffed and in a pa-
trol car?  What if the suspect is handcuffed but otherwise
unsecured?  What if no handcuffs have been applied but
the suspects are placed up against the car or lying on the
ground?  What if one or more suspects are just steps
away from the car?  must the suspects be as close as
within arm’s length of the car to invoke Belton?  how
do glove compartments fit in?  the Court clearly fails
to recognize the extent of the confusion and the subse-
quent litigation it has created by rejecting the bright-line
rule of Belton. 
Gant is also silent as to the treatment of contain-
ers within the passenger compartment.  if suspects rea-
sonably have access to the interior compartments of
vehicles, do they automatically also have access to con-
tainers located within the compartment?  the bright-line
reading of Belton extended to any
containers within the vehicle as well
as to the passenger compartment it-
self.  there were no containers in-
volved in Gant and the ruling gives
courts no guidance about how it
should be applied in cases where con-
tents of a container are at issue.  must
the arrestee independently have rea-
sonable access to the container?
Does it matter where the container is
within the car?  Does the kind of con-
tainer affect the result?  are contain-
ers that are more easily opened more
likely to be accessible to the arrestee
than other more difficult to open con-
tainers?  Will the answers to these
questions have to await yet another
case?
surprisingly and without jus-
tification in our view, the Court then
goes on to carve out an additional ex-
ception to the limitations of Chimel.  this part of the
ruling is an audacious way to attract the vote of Justice
scalia and put together a majority of five votes.  adopt-
ing Justice scalia’s concurrence in Thornton,319 the
Court held that “circumstances unique to the vehicle jus-
tify a search incident to a lawful arrest when it is ‘rea-
sonable to believe [that] evidence relevant to the crime
of arrest might be found in the vehicle.’”320 the Court
recognizes that this new rule “does not follow from
Chimel.”321 moreover, it does nothing to identify the
“circumstances unique to the vehicle context” that jus-
tify the new exception.322 it observes that in some cases
there will be reason to believe that the passenger com-
partment may contain evidence of the arresting offense
and in others it would not.323 the Court, however, gives
no guidance except that it holds that in Gant there is no
reason to so believe—a conclusion with which we take
exception—the car could contain evidence of the crime
of driving with a suspended license.  it is reasonable,
however, to believe that the license itself, the car regis-
tration, or other evidence supporting the charge could
have been found in the glove compartment or other parts
of the vehicle’s interior.  again, the Court fails to rec-
ognize the consequences of the creation of this new ex-
ception.  in short, in the majority opinion rejects what
was an understandable, easily applicable bright-line
rule, replacing it with a two-part Chimel-centric analyt-
ical framework that will lead to extensive litigation.
Justice scalia’s con-
curring opinion is a fasci-
nating exercise in judicial
obfuscation in which he un-
abashedly announces that
he is joining the Court’s
opinion despite his dis-
agreement with half of it.
he enthusiastically em-
braces that part of the ma-
jority opinion that
establishes the “evidence of
the crime” rationale for per-
mitting vehicle searches.
he does not, however,
agree with the majority’s
endorsement of a revived,
post-Belton application of
Chimel.  scalia writes that
Justice stevens’ opinion
“would retain the applica-
tion of Chimel in the car
search context but would apply in the future what he be-
lieves our cases held in the past: that officers making a
roadside stop may search the vehicle as long as the ‘ar-
restee is within reaching distance of the passenger com-
partment at the time of the search.’”324 he takes issue
with this ruling, explaining that “this standard fails to
provide the needed guidance to arresting officers and
also leaves much room for manipulation, inviting offi-
cers to leave the scene unsecured . . . in order to conduct
a vehicle search.”325 he would “simply abandon” what
he calls “the Belton-Thornton charade” and overrule
those cases outright and simply adopt his “evidence of
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The Court...holds that in
Gant there is no reason to
so beleive...[that] the car
could contain evidence of
the crime of suspended
license.  It is reasonable,
however, to believe that
the license itself, the car
registration, or other evi-
dence supporting the
charge could have been
found in the glove 
compartment.
the crime” standard.326
Despite these views, he goes on to join the opin-
ion of the Court.  he acknowledges that no other Justice
shares his view about abandoning the application of
Chimel in these cases.327 But he finds it “unacceptable”
for the Court to issue a 4-1-4 opinion that would “leave[]
the governing rule uncertain.”328 he then asserts that
Belton and Thornton constituted a bright-line rule, albeit
one that endorses cases he considers unconstitutional,
and that the Court’s opinion is an “artificial narrowing
of those cases.”329 he joins the Court, not because he
agrees with it, but because he considers allowing the
bright-line rule to stand is the “greater evil.”330
in his dissent, Justice alito’s shares our view that
the Court, without so admitting, “effectively overrules
[Belton and Thornton] even though respondent gant has
not asked [the Court] to do so.”331 Despite the majority’s
refusal “to acknowledge that it is overruling Belton and
Thornton,” alito concludes, “there can be no doubt that
it does so.”332 alito believes that the majority’s overrul-
ing of Belton departs from the usual rule of stare decisis
without sufficient justification for doing so as required
by that doctrine.333 he argues that the case presents none
of the “special justification[s]” necessary for the Court’s
departure from a constitutional precedent.334 Justice
alito also takes issue with the “evidence of the crime”
basis for the search by questioning the standard of “rea-
son to believe.”335
as expected, Chief Justice roberts and Justices
Kennedy and Breyer agree that Belton should be reaf-
firmed on stare decisis grounds. Justice Breyer writes
in dissent that Belton did indeed create a bright-line rule;
one which he believes sometimes leads to unconstitu-
tional results.336 nevertheless, he says, there are no
grounds upon which to abandon the well-established
precedent that Belton represents.337 Proponents of doing
so have failed to meet their “heavy burden” for over-
turning a ruling on which there has been, as here, “con-
siderable reliance.”338
so, what about Justice scalia and the case of
thomas Jefferson’s carriage?  What would the framers
have expected in the future President’s situation and
how would that apply to the one in which gant and the
arresting officers found themselves?
in order to determine what is and is not “reason-
able” under the fourth amendment, Justice scalia al-
ways begins by looking to “the historical practices the
framers sought to preserve.”339 he must have been frus-
trated in this case because the framers’ practices failed
to provide adequate guidance for how to rule.  he could
not determine, and the litigants could not help him, what
James madison, John adams, and the other framers
would have believed to be reasonable.  he was deter-
mined that because the “historical scope of officers’ au-
thority to search vehicles incident to arrest is uncertain,
traditional standards of reasonableness govern.”340
those standards, he concluded, do not justify the Belton
bright-line rule.341 as we saw, however, the Justices, all
reasonable people, did not come to exactly the same
conclusion on what the standard for such searches
should be. 
of one thing we can be sure: by its ruling in Ari-
zona v. Gant, the supreme Court has completely re-
opened an area of constitutional criminal procedure that
had been settled for nearly three decades.  in doing so,
it has released from Pandora’s Box what will be a deluge
of litigation as police, prosecutors, defense counsel, and
trial and appellate courts—including the high court it-
self—are compelled to grapple with the new standards. 
it is precisely cases like Gant that explain the al-
lure of the doctrine of stare decisis. it makes one long,
along with Justice scalia, for the simplicity of the 18th
century and the elusive wisdom of the case of thomas
Jefferson’s carriage.
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the defendant have been moved to the station house). 
78 for examples of when courts have held a search valid when arrestee
was handcuffed and locked in the police car, see United states v. Weaver,
433 f.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 126 s. Ct. 2053 (2006)
(stating that Belton controls where the arrestee is handcuffed and locked
in a patrol car), cert. denied, 126 s. Ct. 2053 (2006); United states v.
Barnes, 374 f.3d 601, 605 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that a vehicle search
upheld as incident to arrest after arrestee was arrested, handcuffed, and
placed in police patrol car); United states v. Doward, 41 f.3d 789, 794
(1st Cir. 1994) (finding that Belton is controlling where the police per-
formed a contemporaneous search of a hatchback vehicle); United states
v. Patterson, 993 f.2d 121, 123 (6th Cir. 1993) (6th Cir. 1993) (ruling
that Belton controls, even when the vehicle was searched and im-
pounded); United states v. Karlin, 852 f.2d 968, 972 (7th Cir. 1988)
(finding that Belton controls “without determining whether the officer
had rendered Karlin incapable of reaching into the van.”); state v. sk-
aggs, 903 so. 2d 180, 182 (ala. Crim. app. 2004) (holding that Belton is
controlling where the police performed an automobile search incident to
arrest just before the suspect’s relative arrived to take the vehicle home);
People v. stoffle, 3 Cal. rptr. 2d 257, 263 (Cal. Ct. app. 1991) (ruling
that Belton permits vehicle searches incident to arrest where “the evi-
dence discovered during the search had nothing to do with the crime for
which the person was arrested, or where it was just as unlikely as in de-
fendant’s case that weapons would be found.”); state v. Waller, 612 a.2d
1189, 1192 (Conn. 1992) ; state v. hopkins, 293 s.e.2d 529, 531 (ga.
Ct. app. 1982) (holding that Belton controls when “articles in the pas-
senger compartment are ‘unaccessible’ to the arrestee.”); state v.
Wheaton, 825 P.2d 501, 503 (idaho 1992) (holding that under Belton,
“[o]nce having made a lawful custodial arrest of an occupant of an auto-
mobile, there is no need for further justification in order to search the
passenger compartment of an automobile); People v. Bailey, 639 n.e.2d
1278, 1282 (ill. 1994) (“[v]alidity of a Belton search is not affected by
the circumstance that defendant no longer had effective access to his ve-
hicle when the search was conducted.”); state v. edgington, 487 n.W.2d
675, 677–78 (iowa 1992) (holding that Belton permits contemporaneous
searches of passenger compartments incident to arrest, but that searches
of a vehicle’s trunk must be justified on other grounds); state v. Press,
685 P.2d 887, 894 (Kan. 1984); state v. Jerome, 983 so.2d 214, 216 (la.
Ct. app. 4th Cir. 2008); hamel v. state, 943 a.2d 686, 696 (md. Ct.
spec. app. 2008) (ruling that “[t]he fact that hamel was secured and
without access to his vehicle did not cause the search of the locked glove
compartment to exceed the permissible scope of the search incident to
his arrest.”); townsend v. state, 681 so.2d 497, 504 (miss. 1996); state
v. scott, 200 s.W.3d 41, 44 (mo. Ct. app. 2006) (noting that “the con-
cern for officer safety is applicable even when the officer has already se-
cured the suspect in handcuffs. . .”); state v. gonzalez, 487 n.W.2d 567,
572 (neb. 1992) (holding that “handcuffing the arrestee and placing the
suspect away from the grabbable area of the vehicle does not prohibit a
contemporaneous Belton-type search of the vehicle from which the ar-
restee recently came.”); state v. miskolczi, 465 a.2d 919, 921–22 (n.h.
1983); state v. murrell, 764 n.e.2d 986, 992-93 (ohio 2002); state v.
reed, 634 s.W.2d 665, 666 (tenn. Crim. app. 1982) (holding that Bel-
ton controls even when the arrestee is handcuffed and in a non-respon-
sive stupor); Pettigrew v. state, 908 s.W.2d 563, 570 (tex. app. fort
Worth 2d Dist. 1995) (“a search under Belton is allowed even when the
arrestee has been handcuffed and placed in a police car.”); state v.
moreno, 910 P.2d 1245 (Utah Ct. app. 1996).
for examples of when courts have held a search valid when
defendant arrested and placed in patrol car, see state v. valdes, 423 so.
2d 944 (fla. Dist. Ct. app. 1982) (finding that search was valid when the
defendant arrested and placed in patrol car); state v. Cooper, 286 s.e.2d
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102 (n.C. 1982); state v. Wanzek, 598 n.W.2d 811, 816 (n.D. 1999);
Glasco, 513 s.e.2d at 140; state v. fladebo, 720 P.2d 436, 440–41 (Wa.
1986). 
Courts holding searches valid when arrestee handcuffed: see
e.g., United states v. mapp, 476 f.3d 1012, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (up-
holding search of arrestee’s car conducted after arrestee handcuffed and
under police control); United states v. Currence, 446 f.3d 554, 559 (4th
Cir. 2006) (stating that the search of vehicle after arrestee placed in
handcuffs upheld as valid search incident to arrest); United states v. Cot-
ton, 751 f.2d 1146 (10th Cir. 1985) (declaring that the search of defen-
dant’s vehicle after defendant was outside vehicle and handcuffed
upheld); United states v. Collins, 668 f.2d 819, 821 (5th Cir. 1982);
stout v. state, 898 s.W.2d 457 (ark. 1995) (holding that the search of
vehicle after arrestee placed in handcuffs upheld); Black v. state, 810
n.e.2d 713, 716 (ind. 2004); Rainey, 197 s.W.3d at 95 (articulating that
the search of arrestee’s car upheld even though conducted after he was
handcuffed and “so far from his vehicle that it was unlikely he could
have accessed it”); state v. harvey, 648 s.W.2d 87, 90 (mo. 1983) (up-
holding the search of vehicle when arrestee was handcuffed out of the
car and presided over by two armed detectives).
Courts also recognize the nearly universal acceptance of Bel-
ton as a bright-line rule.  See, e.g., People v. savedra, 907 P.2d at 598 n.1
(Colo. 1995) (citing federal courts of appeals cases, the court states that
“the passenger compartment is within the Belton zone even where the ar-
restee is away from the vehicle and safely within police custody at the
time of the search”); United states v. mendez, 139 f. supp.2d 273, 279
(D. Conn. 2001) (stating that a myriad of cases have concluded that the
“search of an automobile is generally reasonable even if the occupant
has exited the vehicle and is under the control of an officer”); traylor v.
state, 458 a.2d 1170, 1174 (Del. 1983) (noting that Belton is applicable
to a search of a vehicle even though defendant arrested and in hand-
cuffs); People v. mungo, 747 n.W.2d 875, 882 (mich. Ct. app. 2008)
(stating that Belton rule has “been interpreted to permit a full search of
the interior of an automobile even when the arrestee has been removed
from the car, handcuffed, and placed in a secure area, thus alleviating
concerns of officer safety and preservation of any evidence contained in
the car”); state v. White, 489 n.W.2d 792, 796 (minn. 1992) (“thus,
under Belton, an incidental search of the car is allowed even after the de-
fendant is placed in the squad car.”); state v. rice, 327 n.W.2d 128, 131
(s.D. 1982) (accepting Belton’s reasoning and as a bright-line rule).
79 See, e.g., state v. greenwald, 858 P.2d 36, 43 (nev. 1993) (a search
conducted of defendant’s motorcycle after he was locked away in a po-
lice car was not a valid search incident to arrest); state v. eckel, 888
a.2d 1266, 1277 (n.J. 2006) (rejecting bright-line application of Belton
when defendant was arrested and placed in a patrol car under state con-
stitution); state v. rowell, 188 P.3d 95, 101 (n.m. 2008) (rejecting Bel-
ton bright-line rule in favor of a search incident to arrest exception
“anchored in the specific circumstances facing an officer”); People v.
Blasich, 541 n.e.2d 40, 43 (n.y. 1989) (rejecting the Belton bright-line
rule and interpreting the state constitution to limit warrantless searches
of automobiles incident to arrest only to area from which arrestee might
actually gain possession of weapon or destructible evidence); state v.
Kirsch, 686 P.2d 446, 448 (or. Ct. app. 1984) (finding that the state con-
stitution allows search incident to arrest only if necessary to protect offi-
cer or preserve evidence or when the search is relevant to the crime for
which the suspect was arrested); Commonwealth v. White, 669 a.2d
896, 902 (Pa. 1995) (arguing that a search incident to arrest is not justi-
fied when defendant was patted down, moved a short distance from the
car, and under close police guard); state v. Bauder, 924 a.2d 38, 46 (vt.
2007) (rejecting Belton under the state constitution); holman v. state,
183 P.3d 368, 373, 377 (Wyo. 2008) (holding that under the totality of
the circumstances, there were no articuable safety concerns to justify a
search of the vehicle while the defendant was handcuffed and in a squad
car); see also Commonwealth v. toole, 448 n.e.2d 1264, 1268 (mass.
1983) (stating that a search conducted while defendant was arrested,
handcuffed, and in custody of two state troopers was invalidated under
state law).
80 see, e.g., United states v. lugo, 978 f.2d 631, 635 (10th Cir. 1992)
(articulating that Belton does not control when an arrestee is no longer
on the scene); United states v. vasey, 834 f.2d 782, 787–88 (9th Cir.
1987) (finding that there was no exigency to justify a warrantless search
conducted thirty to forty-five minutes after an arrest and while defendant
was handcuffed and seated in the rear of a police car); state v. Badgett,
512 a.2d 160, 169 (Conn. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.s. 940 (1986) (de-
claring that Belton only applies when arrestee remains at the scene);
state v. Kunkel, 455 n.W.2d 208, 210 (n.D. 1990) (stating that a search
incident to arrest exception does not apply when vehicle is searched at a
location other than the scene of the arrest); see also Wayne r. lafave,
searCh anD seiZUre: a treatise on the foUrth amenDment § 7.1(c),
at 518 n. 92 (4th ed. 2004)[hereinafter lafave, search and seizure] (list-
ing cases having an “on-the-scene requirement”). 
81See Belton, 453 U.s. at 458 (citing Wayne r. lafave, “Case-By-Case
Adjudication” Versus “Standardized Procedures”: The Robinson
Dilemma, 1974 sUP. Ct. rev. 127, 142 [hereinafter lafave, The Robin-
son Dilemma] (approving of bright-line rules as easier for police to
apply)).
82 See, e.g., albert W. alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth
Amendment, 45 U. Pitt. l. rev. 227, 274 (1984) (stating that once occu-
pants are removed from a vehicle, there is little chance they will be able
to get a weapon or destroy evidence in the vehicle); Jeffrey a. Carter,
Fourth Amendment – of Cars, Containers and Confusion, 72 J. Crim. l.
& Criminology 1171, 1173, 1217–21 (1981) (stating that the Belton de-
cision enhanced the confusion concerning fourth amendment require-
ments for automobile and container searches); Wayne r. lafave, The
Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing “Bright Lines”
and “Good Faith”, 43 U. Pitt. l. rev. 307, 325 (1981–1982) [here-
inafter lafave, The Fourth Amendment] (arguing that Belton does a dis-
service to the development of sound fourth amendment doctrine);
lawrence gene sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, 95 harv. l. rev.
251, 260 (1981); robert stern, robbins v. California and new york v.
Belton: The Supreme Court Opens Car Doors to Container Searches, 31
am. U. l. rev. 291, 317 (1982) (arguing that Belton diminished the
value in balancing the protection of privacy interests with the promotion
of law enforcement activities in the area of automobile and container
searches). 
83 541 U.s. at 615 (2004).
84 Id. at 617. 
85 Id.
86 Id. at 617–18.
87 Id. at 618.











98 Thornton, 541 U.s. at 618.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 618–19.
101 Id. at 619.
102 See Belton, 453 U.s. at 455–56.
103 See Thornton, 541 U.s. at 620–21 (noting that the Court’s dicta in
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triCt, Criminal investigations manUal Ch. 2, 7, available at
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128 Thornton, 541 U.s. at 631.
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130 Id. at 632 (scalia, J., concurring); Rabinowitz, 339 U.s. at 56. 
131 Thornton, 541 U.s. at 632 (scalia, J., concurring).  
132 for example, would such a search ever be unreasonable or is it a
bright-line rule of reasonableness?  must the arrest be of a recent occu-
pant and the search contemporaneous to the arrest?  if so, why?  What is
the scope of the permissible search?  may police look only in those
places likely to reveal such related evidence?  What evidence is related
to each particular crime and what is not?  What about containers?  are
legitimate searches limited to those containers reasonably likely to con-
tain evidence of the arrest crime? Can’t drug evidence be found any-
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being searched?  how will we determine the reasonableness of police
decisions?  Will the good faith exception apply?
133 Thornton, 541 U.s. at 636 (stevens, J., dissenting).  
134 Id.  Justice o’Connor concurred, separately, writing that the major-
ity’s opinion in Thornton was “a logical extension of the holding in New
York v. Belton, [but she wrote] separately to express [her] dissatisfaction
with the state of the law in this area.”  Id. at 624 (o’Connor J., concur-
ring) (citation omitted).  the Court treated Belton searches as “entitle-
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erosion is a direct consequence of Belton’s shaky foundation.”  Id. o’-
Connor also expressed her agreement with Justice scalia’s approach but
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issue.   Id. at 625.
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